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If citizens can work or reside abroad, i.e. if there is international mobility 
of people, how should the income tax jurisdiction of a country be exercised 
over the subset that is so mobile? That is, should the income tax be extended 
to citizens abroad, on a citizenship nexus, or should it be levied on the basis 
of residence, thereby effectively exempting from its scope those citizens who 
are abroad? The Symposium in this issue addresses this novel and interesting 
question in public finance theory for open economies.’ 
This question has come to theoretical scrutiny by the rather indirect route 
of a proposal to ‘tax the brain drain’, i.e. to extend income taxation to skilled 
migrants from the developing to the developed countries. This proposal had 
several different moral-philosophical and economic rationales: among these 
being the raising of revenue from successful, internationally mobile citizens to 
assist development in the countries of their origin or citizenship.2 It seemed 
therefore that if the developing countries could exercise their income tax 
jurisdiction over their citizens abroad, contrary to the current practice, they 
would have an added source of revenue and would also bring into the tax 
net a generally high-income set of citizens who were hitherto exempt simply 
on grounds of their locale. In short, to put the matter quite generally, one 
should reject ‘representation without taxation’, i.e. citizenship without the 
obligation to pay the income tax.3 
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John Wilson made helpful comments. 
‘The papers in this Symposium, among others, were presented at a Conference on The 
Exercise of Income Tax Jurisdiction Over Citizens Abroad, held in New Delhi during January 
1981, with financial support from the Ford Foundation and the National Institute of Public 
Finance and Policy, New Delhi. 
‘Cf. Bhagwati (1977, 1979, 1980) Bhagwati and Partington (1976) and Oldman and Pomp 
(1975, 1977, 1979) among several discussions of the proposal from economic, legal, human- 
rights, administrative, sociological and moral&philosophical viewpoints. 
sThis phraseology, while colorful and apt, may be a trifle misleading if ‘representation’ is 
taken to mean not citizenship generally but the specific right to vote. The voting right is 
occasionally abridged for citizens abroad owing to administrative and procedural restrictions 
and considerable diversity obtains in regard to this situation. 
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The problem that emerges then for public finance theory is evident: we 
need an extension of the usual income tax theory to an open economy 
(where openness implies international mobility). Many problems then 
immediately spring to attention. For example, what is the optimal income 
tax rate for citizens abroad relative to the optimal tax rate for citizens at 
home [Bhagwati and Hamada (1982), Mirrlees (1982), Wilson (1982a)], and 
what is the nature of the distortions that follow and what are the second-best 
solutions and policy instruments if the tax rate on citizens abroad is 
arbitrarily set at zero, as in many countries today [Bhagwati and Hamada 
(1982), Wilson (1982b)]? The papers in this Symposium address many of 
these issues. 
But many more issues need further modelling. For example, the possibility 
of tax evasion, a critical one insofar as taxing non-residents is a serious 
problem4 (though, taxing even residents is for many developing countries 
possibly an equally, if not more, difficult administrative problem), needs to be 
incorporated into the theoretical analysis. 
Yet another significant issue arises because of the harmonization question 
implied by the co-existence of different income tax systems. In the United 
States (and the Philippines)” the ‘global’ income tax system that extends the 
income tax to citizens abroad is practised; other countries are on the 
‘schedular’ income tax system that does not.’ For the United States, this has 
meant a twofold problem, with consequent opposition to its global system 
from political lobbies preferring the schedular system. 
(I) Private US citizens abroad, who are taxed on the basis of the global 
system, allege that they are unfairly taxed because nationals of other 
countries abroad (e.g. Frenchmen in Bangkok, alongside Americans) are not 
so taxed by their own governments and because nationals of the countries 
where they reside (e.g. the Thais in Bangkok) are subject only to domestic 
taxes (e.g. the Thai income tax) which are equally borne by the US citizens 
on top of such US income tax as becomes applicable. Hence, the intra- 
4This problem is addressed in an informed analysis of the administrative and legal aspects of 
the experience of the Philippines with taxing citizens abroad, by Pomp (19X2) in his paper at the 
New Delhi Conference. 
51t is interesting that the US practice has spread to its former colony, whereas the European 
practice has spread to their former colonies. Since the Americans have not been colonkrs on 
the scale and gusto of the Europeans during Europe’s outward expansion. it is inevitable 
therefore that the global system is currently being practised in near isolation by the Philippines 
and the United States. Incidentally, Mexico also theoretically taxes citizens everywhere; in 
practice, in a sad commentary on the state of tax administration in many developing countries. 
the income tax is not enforced in the case of residents abroad. 
“These contrasts are not wholly pure. Thus, for example. the United States does extend 
aeberal exemptions (other than double-tax avoidance) to citizens abroad: and there are certainly 
restrictions in European systems on the definition of foreign residence which justifies exclusion 
from tax liability. The central thrust, and principles, of the two tax systems are very clear and 
different, however, in both cases. 
nationul (horizontul) equity of the global system runs afoul of the internationul 
(horizontal) equity claims. 
(2) Also, once trade in goods is considered, the harmonization issue 
becomes one of efficiency, rather than only equity. If US firms have to pay 
US income tax on US citizens they employ abroad, whereas French firms 
employing Frenchmen abroad do not have to pay the French income tax, 
distortion of comparative advantage could easily follow. That is to say, 
French firms, having to pay certain net-of-tax salaries for, say, Saudi 
construction contracts, would then have a smaller real cost, ceteris paribus, 
than US firms competing for the same contracts. Of course, this assumes that 
the incidence of the global tax system, unlike in the models of personal 
income taxation in this Symposium in the tradition of the classic papers of 
Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1973) does not fall on the taxed individuals. It 
also assumes, in the stark version outlined above, that the French firms must 
hire Frenchmen and the US firms must hire Americans: if the two were total 
substitutes, as they almost certainly are not for different reasons, the 
harmonization issue would disappear. This problem needs formal analysis 
but has certainly played a major role in the political economy of American 
income taxation. People such as Senator Proxmire, who accept the equity 
underlying the global system and argue that the cafe-crawling Americans in 
Paris ought to pay their share of American taxes instead of leaving the 
burden to be borne by the workers in Detroit, have been traditionally pitted 
against pressure groups such as the corporations handling construction 
works abroad.’ 
Quite remarkably, the countries that are on the schedular system have 
hardly ever debated the merits of the alternative, global tax system. Thus, to 
cite just a single instance, the Meade Commission on direct taxation failed 
even to raise the matter in its otherwise comprehensive report, implicitly 
taking for granted the existing schedular system in consequence. Indeed, an 
interesting question in the historical evolution of the two rival systems of 
taxation, the global in the United States and the schedular in the European 
countries, is why these contrasts exist. 
The United States, from the very beginning, appears to have defined tax 
equity on a citizenship basis, the judicial determination of the issue going so 
far as even to maintain that payment of the income tax was a privilege, if not 
a duty, of citizenship. By contrast, in the British case, the levy of the income 
tax has always been on a residence principle, from the time of its imposition 
by Pitt to pay for the Napoleonic War. The failure however to extend the 
tax, no matter what its original design, to citizens resident abroad may have 
been due to any or all of the following factors. (i) A colonial power such as 
Great Britain, unlike a newly-established immigrants’ country such as the 
*For a historical review of this tussle, see Bhagwati (1981) 
United States, had several citizens abroad during the period of European 
outward expansion. It was likely that the many such British abroad had 
powerful connections with the Parliament, and were unlikely to be taxed by 
their friends. (ii) A more agreeable reason might simply be that, if many 
abroad were civil servants running the Empire, then the incidence of the 
global tax might fall on the Treasury itself: if so, only transaction costs 
would be incurred by taxing these citizens overseas. (iii) Again, the idea that 
all citizens should bear an appropriate burden of taxation is an egalitarian 
notion that is more consistent with the early American notions of democracy 
and political ideals than those of the more stratified, hierarchical European 
societies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.* 
‘These questions are raised, and addressed with a skeletal historical analysis for the United 
States and for Great Britain, in Bhagwati and Wooton (1982). They await more sustained and 
penetrating historical research. 
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